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THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING FOR THE
SUSPENSION OF A DRIVER'S LICENSEI
PAUL A. JOHNSTON*
Most driver license acts provide at least three methods by which a
state may withdraw a citizen's license to drive; revocation, cancellation,
and suspension. Revocations are in many jurisdictions discretionary,1
but in one type of situation are usually mandatory, namely following
court convictions for commission of certain offenses.2 Cancellations
take effect on the discovery of erroneous information given on appli-
cations.3 Suspensions are almost exclusively discretionary with the
agency administering driver license laws and may result from a variety
of causes.4 It is with this last mentioned method, or rather with the
procedures used at the hearings which precede or follow these suspen-
sions, that this note is primarily concerned.5
THE NATURE OF THE LICENSE
Before any detailed discussion of the necessary elements of a hearing
for license suspension can be attempted there must first be a determina-
tion of whether the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways
is a mere privilege, a right, or something in between.
t Tlis article was prepared during the summer of 1951 while the author was
serving as a member of the staff of the Institute of Government. It is part of a
forthcoming study to be published by the Institute in its LAW AND ADMINISTRATION
series.
* Editor-in-Chief, THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW RVIEW.
'CAL. VEHICLE CODE ANN. §314(a) (1949); CONN. GEN. STAT. §2456 (1949);
GA. CODE ANN. §92A421 (Cum. Supp. 1947) and regulations pursuant thereto;
IND. ANN. STAT. §47-1081 (Supp. 1949); ME. RaV. STAT. C. 19 §6 (1944); MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 90 §22 (1946); NEB. REV. STAT. §60-425 (1943); N. H. REV.
LAWS c. 118 §32 (1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. §68-318 (1941); N. J. STAT. ANN.
§39:5-30 (Supp. 1950); N. Y. VkaIcLE LAW §41-3; R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 86, §6
(1938); S. C. CODE ANN. §5996 (5) (1942); and most states having in force
The Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act.
'All states which provide for administrative suspensions and revocations pro-
vide that for some convictions revocation inust follow.
Typical is §25 of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs'
License Act: "(a) The department is hereby authorized to cancel any operator's or
chauffeur's license upon determining that the licensee was not entitled to the is-
suance thereof hereunder or that said licensee failed to give the required or cor-
rect information in his application. .. ."
'Some of the many causes justifying a suspension are: The licensee, (1) is
an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle, (2) is incompetent
to drive a motor vehicle, (3) has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of such
license.
The North Carolina Statute, N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-16 (Supp. 1951), includes
under discretionary reasons, various court convictions in various combinations.
" This material is also applicable to those revocations which are left to the dis-
cretion of administrative bodies. See note 1 supra.
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The earliest cases ruling on statutes regulating the operation of
automobiles consistently held such statutes constitutional.0 Certainly
no one would question the correctness of these cases on the point. How-
ever, in 1913 the New York court, by way of dictum, stretched the
power to regulate to the power to prohibit altogether. In People v.
Rosenheimer7 the court used these words: "The Legislature might pro-
hibit altogether the use of motor vehicles upon the highways or streets
of the state."8 The authorities cited by the court for the language quoted
above are State v. Mayo9 and Commonwealth v. Kingsbury.10 The
Mayo case actually was concerned with a city ordinance which permitted
particular streets to be closed to automobiles. That opinion stands for
nothing more than the rule that the operation of automobiles is subject
to regulation; just as are all personal and property rights.": Nor does
the Kingsbury case stand for any more.12
Of course the New York court was free to declare such a proposition
as being the law in that state without citing any authority; and the
position taken was actually a reasonable and proper one (rather than a
misreading of the cases) in view of the court's attitude as of that date,
toward automobiles. This is shown by the language immediately fol-
lowing the citation of the Mayo and Kingsbury cases: "Doubtless the
Legislature could not prevent citizens from using the highways in the
'Emerson Troy Granite Co. v. Pearson, 74 N. H. 22, 64 Atl. 582 (1906);
Unwen v. State, 73 N. J. L. 529, 64 Atl. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1906) ; Fletcher v. Dixon,
107 Md. 420, 68 Atl. 875 (1908) ; Cleary v. Johnston, 79 N. J. L. 49, 74 At. 538(Sup. Ct. 1909) ; State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295 (1909) ; City of Mobile
v. Gentry, 170 Ala. 234, 54 So. 488 (1911).
S209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913).8Id. at 120, 102 N. E. at 532. The case has since been often cited for this lan-
guage without analysis of the case or consideration of the date and circumstances
of the decision.
o 106 Me. 62, 75 Atl. 295 (1909).
10199 Mass. 542, 85 N. E. 848 (1908).
"1"It is an equal right of all to use the public streets for purposes of travel
. ; and it is also too well recognized in judicial decisions to be questioned that
an automobile is a legitimate means of conveyance on the public highways. But
the right to so use the public streets, as well as all personal and property rights,
is not an absolute and unqualified right. It is subject to be limited and controlled
." State v. Mayo, 106 Me. 62, 66, 75 Atl. 295, 297 (1909).
The following language appears on the same page ". . . individuals may be
subjected to restraints, and the enjoyment of personal and property rights may be
limited, or even prevented, if manifestly necessary to develop the resources of the
state, improve its industrial conditions, and secure and advance the safety, comfort,
and prosperity of its people." [Italics added]
In other words a valid exercise of the police power does not offend the Consti-
tution. The question remains as to whether the forbidding of the use of auto-
mobiles on public highways would be a valid exercise of the police power. This
decision does not stand for the proposition that it would.
" "The right of the Legislature, acting under the police power, to prescribe
that automobiles shall not pass over certain streets . . . , seems to us well estab-
lished both upon principle and authority." Commonwealth v. Kingsbury, 199 Mass.
542, 546, 85 N. E. 848, 849 (1908).
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ordinary manner . .. "13 [Italics supplied] When the two quotations
are considered together it can be seen that what at first appears to be
a misunderstanding of the cited cases was rather an inference -drawn
which is explainable by the date of the cases. The key to the court's
reasoning is simply this: The driving of automobiles on the highways
was not, even as late as 1913, considered by this court as an "ordinary
use of the highways." It follows that when such use is considered an
ordinary use the proposition must fall. The same respected justice who
wrote the opinion in the Rosenheimer case could consistently hold in
1951 that the Legislature could no more prohibit altogether the use of
automobiles on the highway than it could prohibit the use of sidewalks
by pedestrians.1 4 To continue citing the Rosenheimer case for the rule
that driving an automobile is a mere privilege revocable by the state in
any manner it sees fit seems highly unrealistic. 15
" People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 120, 102 N. E. 530, 53Z (1913).
" The Iowa Supreme Court recognized this principle as early as 1914. In State
v. Gish that court stated: "It [the Legislature] can no more prohibit such use
[of highways by motor vehicles] than it could prohibit the use of lumber wagons."
168 Iowa 70, 75, 150 N. W. 37, 38 (1914). As a corollary to this statement it
could now be added that if the use of lumber wagons becomes an extraordinary
use of the highways the Legislature can prohibit their use thereon.
" The courts of New York have, to a great extent, abandoned the exact lan-
guage and proposition of the Rosenheimer case so far as this particular aspect is
concerned.
The Court of Appeals has cited the case twice in the last ten years (as of the
date of this writing). Good Humour Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N. Y. 312,
317, 49 N. E. 2d 153, 155 (1943) and People v. Bearden, 290 N. Y. 478, 483, 49
N. E. 2d 785, 788 (1943). In the Good Humour case the reference was as fol-
lows: "The right to use a street by any person even for travelling must be exer-
cised in a mode consistent with the equal rights of others to use the highway."
The reference in the Bearden case had to do with the difference between criminal
and civil negligence.
During the same period three lower court decisions in New York have relied
on the Rosenheiimer case to support an expressiori of the privilege doctrine: Heart
v. Fletcher, 184 Misc. 659, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1945) (In this confusing
opinion there appears this reasoning: "The payment by the petitioner of the re-
quired fees upon the issuance to him of the operator's license did not convert the
privilege granted into a property right of which he might not be deprived without
a notice and hearing, i.e. due process of law." Following this language the court
quotes at length from Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 246-247
(1944). The passage which the court quotes discusses the requirements of due
process when interfering with a property right. After this quotation the New
York Court proceeds to point out that the New York statute under attack provides
these requirements and "therefore" does not offend the due process clause) ; Ohlsen
v. Mealy, 179 Misc. 13, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 123 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (this case, like the
Heart case, was concerned with a mandatory suspension under the Financial Re-
sponsibility Act) ; Fochi v. Splain, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 774 (Sup. Ct. 1942) (this case
was concerned with the refusal to re-issue a license to operate a drivers' school).
Although the New York courts have for the most part shown a change of atti-
tude (as will be pointed out further in this note) regarding the language of the
Rosenheiner case, other jurisdictions continue to cite it as authority for the mere
privilege doctrine. Also often cited are People v. Stryker, 124 Misc. 1, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1924) (based squarely on the Rosenheimer case), and People
v. Cohen, 128 Misc. 29, 217 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct. 1926) (based on the Stryker
case).
1951]
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Another case which has been often cited and which stands for the
proposition that operating an automobile on the public highways is a
mere privilege is La Plante v. Board of Public Roads.' 6 In this opinion
the Rhode Island court used this language: "It is evident that a license
to operate a motor vehicle is a permit to 'do that which would otherwise
be unlawful."' 17 The court then cites a text' s and three cases.' 0  Two
of the cases are concerned with the use of the highways by for-hire
vehicles, and the other deals with the revocation of a milk dealer's li-
cense.20 By its citation of cases involving for-hire vehicles the Rhode
Island court showed itself to be either unaware of, or unconcerned with,
the well established difference between the use of public property for
business purposes and the ordinary use of public property by private
citizens acting as such.21 The court's label of "privilege" is also weak-
ened by the fact that the statute which the decision upheld as constitu-
tional, though permitting suspension without hearing, also provided for
a full hearing on appeal to the courts.22
1047 R. I. 258, 131 Atl. 641 (1926) (upholding a suspension of petitioner's
driving license without any hearing by the administrative official).17 Id. at 261, 131 Adt. at 642.
'8 BABBITT, LAW APPLIED TO MOTOR VEHIcLES §233 (3d ed. -).
'o Burgess v. Board of Alderman, 235 Mass. 100, 126 N. E. 456 (1920) ; Child
v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 Adt. 539 (1891) (both cases deal with for-hire vehicles) ;
People ex rel. Lodes v. Dept. of Health, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907)
(revocation of license to sell milk).
20 See note 19 supra.
2" That the distinction was well recognized at the time of the La Plante deci-
sion is shown by the following cases: Packard v. Benton, 264 U. S. 140 (1924) ;
Scott v. Hart, 128 Miss. 353, 91 So. 17 (1922) ; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash.
657, 168 Pac. 516 (1920); Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781 (1915)
and cases cited in these decisions.
For later cases supporting the distinction see: Jewel Tea Co. v. City Council,
59 Ga. 305, 200 S. E. 503 (1938) ; Bell Bros. Trucking Co. v. Kelley, 277 Ky. 781,
127 S. W. 2d 831 (1939) ; Huffman v. City of Columbia, 146 S. C. 436, 144 S. E.
157 (1928).
The statement that the license "is a permit to do that which would otherwise
be unlawful" is an over-simplification too often used as a substitute for an ade-
quate analysis of the problem. In the first place it is historically untrue. See the
historical discussion in Ex parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781 (1915) and
City of Rochester v. Falk, 170 Misc. 238, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 343 (Rochester Crim.
1939). In the second place, if its truth as a legal proposition be conceded, the
legislature having made driving "otherwise [i.e. without a license] illegal," it does
not necessarily means that the license can be suspended or revoked summarily.
For instance, to vote without meeting the qualifications set out by the legislature
and without registering is illegal, therefore by the above reasoning a registration
receipt is a "permit to do that which would otherwise be unlawful." But, it does
not follow that the legislature may summarily revoke or suspend the right to vote,
This analogy is not meant to suggest that driving an automobile is in the same
classification as the right to vote. It is rather meant to demonstrate that declaring
the license to be a permit to do that which would otherwise be unlawful is mean-
ingless so far as aiding in the proper classification of the activity.
22 "Statutory proceedings affecting property rights, which, by later resort to
the courts, secure to adverse parties an opportunity to be heard, suitable to the
occasion, do not deny due process. Familiar examples are the decisions and orders
of administrative agencies which determine rights subject to a subsequent judicial
[Vol. 30
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A third case which is often cited for the "mere privilege" doctrine
is Commonwealth v. Funk, decided in Pennsylvania in 1936. i This
decision relies heavily on the La Plante case24 and People v. Stryker,2 5
a New York case based wholly on the Rosenheimer opinion.2 6 The
label here is also weakened by the fact that the driver concerned re-
ceived a full hearing by the Secretary of Revenue and a hearing de novo2 7
in the court of common pleas.2 8
It is clear from a study of the later decisions by the New York courts
that they no longer regard the operation of an automobile on the public
highway as a mere privilege to be withdrawn in a summary manner.
A change of attitude can be detected in the cases as early as 1927. In
Albrecht v. Harnett one New York court used this more careful lan-
guage: "The use of automobiles, even by owners, is a matter reasonably
subject to governmental regulation .... "29 In 1939 another court of
that state had this to say: "The license was not a gift of a sovereign as
a favor. It was granted by the state as a right to whomever should
review." Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U. S. 233, 246-247 (1944).
But see Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,
316 U. S. 4, 10 (1942). "If the administrative agency has committed errors of
law for the correction of which the legislature has provided appropriate resort to
the courts, such judicial review would be idle ceremony if the situation were ir-
reparably changed before the correction could be made."
-There seems little danger that a licensee would be irreparably damaged between
the time his license is suspended and the time when he can get judicial review.
However, that damage could result which a reversal would not cure, must be
admitted. By far the better practice is that provided by the vast majority of states,
i.e. an administrative hearing, either before suspension or immediately thereafter.
See note 45 infra. In view of the fact that most people can ill afford the expense
and trouble of an appeal it would seem that ordinary considerations of fair play
would dictate that a hearing be given on such an important matter as the suspension
or revocation of a driver's license, whether full judicial review is available or not.
"2323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936).
" La Plante v. State Board of Public Roads, 47 R. I. 258, 131 Atl. 641 (1926).
"124 Misc. 1, 206 N. Y. Supp. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
"o People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N. Y. 115, 102 N. E. 530 (1913). Also cited in
the Funk case are People v. Cohen, 128 Misc. 29, 217 N. Y. Supp. 726 (Sup. Ct.
1926) (See note 15 supra.) ; Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279,
298 Pac. 481 (1931) (this opinion upholds a financial responsibility law and cites
for its "privilege" doctrine Hendricks v. Maryland 235 U. S. 610 (1915) which
upheld a Maryland license act against an attack by a resident of the District of
Columbia. The argument presented was that such act was a burden on interstate
commerce); Burgess v. Mayor of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 126 N. E. 456 (1920)
(a case dealing with for-hire vehicles).
"1 "This system sets up every requirement of due process of law, and an operator
whose license has been revoked cannot complain that he has been arbitrarily de-
prived of the enjoyment of the privilege" Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390,
397, 186 Atl. 65, 68 (1936).
" The petitioner herein had been tried by a court for operating an automobile
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and found not guilty. In spite of
the court's verdict, the Secretary revoked the petitioner's license on the grounds of
drunken driving. This decision upholds the ruling of the Secretary and finds no
double jeopardy on the theory that the court trial was a criminal proceeding and
the hearing before the Secretary was civil.2221 App. Div. 487, - , 224 N. Y. Supp. 97, 99 (4th Dept. 1927).
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establish his ability. ."30 In a case decided in 1940 the court used
this language concerning a driver's license: "He has a vested right
therein which cannot be taken from him capriciously or arbitrarily."8 1
Later decisions continue to demonstrate the regard which the New York
courts have come to hold for what was once so definitely labelled a mere
privilege. 32
The same regard can be -discerned by a glance at the more recent
Pennsylvania decisions.~3 In 1942 the highest court of that state used
these words: ".... a qualified person may not be deprived of the privilege
*.. by arbitrary action of the officers entrusted with the administration
of the code."3 4 On consideration of a case in 1948 where the court of
common pleas had affirmed a suspension by merely determining that
the evidence justified the Secretary's finding, the supreme court on ap-
peal said this: "The court's action ... amounted to a denial of the full,
fair and impartial hearing which is an inherent and unalienable right of
our Anglo-Saxon legal heritage and which our constitutional guarantees
are designed to safeguard and protect."3 5
The Rhode Island court seems to have expressed no change in atti-
tude since the La Plante case but as was the situation when that case8 0
was tecided, the Rhode Island statute provides a full court review of
the administrative decisions.3 7
The courts of most jurisdictions continue to pay at least lip service
to the "privilege" doctrine.3 8 However, in addition to the change of
.- 0 City of Rochester v. Falk, 170 Misc. 238, -, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 343, 346
(Rochester Crim. 1939).
"' Application of Goodwin, 173 Misc. 169, - , 17 N. Y. S. 2d 426, 428 (Supp.
Ct. 1940).
"Application of Kafka, 272 App. Div. 364, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (1st Dept.
1947) ; Cohn v. Fletcher, 272 App. Div. 1080, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 329 (3d Dept. 1947) ;
Sand v. Fletcher, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1945) ; McCord v. Fletcher, 182
Misc. 447, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 89 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
11 Actually the Pennsylvania courts have never clearly placed the operation of
a motor vehicle for private purposes in the same class with recognized incrc privi-
leges such as permits for commercial use of the highways, beer and liquor licenses,
pool room and dance hall permits, etc.
" Commonwealth v. Irwin, 345 Pa. 504, 507, 29 A. 2d 68, 69 (1942).
" Commonwealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 644, 60 A. 2d 37, 39 (1948).
36 La Plante v. State Board of Public Roads, 47 R. I. 258, 131 Atl. 641 (1926).
" R. I. GEr. LAws c. 86 §6 (1938), as interpreted by the La Plante case.
3"Roden v. State, 15 Ala. App. 156, 72 So. 605 (1916) ; Goodwin v. Superior
Court of Yavapai County, 68 Ariz. 108, 201 P. 2d 124 (1948) ; People v. Higgins,
87 Cal. App. 2d 938, 197 P. 2d 417 (1948) ; Doyle v. Kahl, 46 N. W. 2d 52 (Iowa
1951) ; Commonwealth v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S. W. 2d 579 (1939) ; Larr v.
Dignan, 317 Mich. 121, 26 N. W. 2d 872 (1947) ; State v. Moyers 86 Okla. Cr.
101, 189 P. 2d 952 (1948); Taylor v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. Rep. 568, 209 S. W.2d 191 (1948) ; Goulter v. Huse, 196 Wash. 652, 84 P. 2d 126 (1938) ; Nutler v.
State Road Comm'n., 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S. E. 549 (1937).
The Virginia decisions on the point seem to have developed in just the opposite
manner from those in New York. In Virginia's first case dealing with the issue,
Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 377, 154 S. E. 579, 583 (1930), the Virginia
Court said: "The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways . . . is a
[Vol. 30
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attitude demonstrated by the decisions of New York and Pennsylvania,
there are other jurisdictions in which comparatively recent cases have
recognized the principle that considerably more than a mere privilege
is involved. The court which has openly declared the rule which most
other courts are now leaning toward (in results if not in language), is
the Supreme Court of Idaho. In State v. Kouni,3 9 where that court
considered a discretionary suspension by an administrative official, the
majority held that such action under the particular statutory provision
common right which he has under his right to enjoy, life and liberty, to acquire
and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right...
to use ... a horse drawn carriage or wagon, or to operate an automobile thereon
.... It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street,
operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for
hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will. . . ." In re-
ferring to the doctrine that because a4 state may prohibit the doing of a thing alto-
gether, it also may regulate in any manner it wishes, the court adds (Id. at 378,
379, 154 S. E. at 583, 584), "This doctrine has been pronounced most often in
cases involving the granting, refusing, and revoking of licenses ... to sell in-
toxicating liquors ...keeping a gambling house or a bawdy house, or operating
a junk or pawn shop. . . . But this doctrine-has no application to ... private
automobiles [operated] in the usual and ordinary way...."
This well reasoned decision recognized a distinction which other enlightened
courts have come to appreciate in effect if not in words, yet for some reason, in
later cases in Virginia there seems to have been a deliberate effort to undermine
the law of this case. In Hannabass v. Ryan, 164 Va. 519, 524, 180 S. E. 416, 417(1935), the court refers to granting or withholding the "privilege." In Law v.
Commonwealth, 171 Va. 449, 454, 199 S. E. 516, 519 (1938), the court cites with
strong approval a West Virginia case which is contra the Thompson case. In Com-
monwealth v. Ellett, 174 Va. 403, 414, 4 S. E. 2d 762, 767 (1938) the court states,
"The license ...is not a contract or property right in a constitutional sense."
For this the Thompson case is cited. (The Thompson case has been interpreted
to stand for just the opposite; see the dissent in State v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493, 76
P. 2d 917 (1938), and Note, 24 VA. L. REv. 922 (1938). In Pritchard v. Battle, 178
Va. 455, 17 S. E. 2d 393 (1941), the court ignores the distinction in licenses recog-
nized in the Thompson case and cites the Law case for the privilege doctrine.
But see Kizee v. Conway, 184 Va. 300, 35 S. E. 2d 99 (1945). In Auglin v. Joyner,
181 Va. 660, 664, 26 S. E. 2d 58, 59 (1943), the court uses the very phrase "mere
privilege." But, in Butler v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 411, 53 S. E. 2d 152 (1949)
the court condemned as inadequate for suspension the finding that a licensee was
an 'habitual violator' without application of the standard "necessary for the safety
of the public on the highways of this state."
It is here respectfully submitted that the Virginia Court could well reconsider
its critical attitude regarding the Thompson case since those courts dealing most
with the point have approximated its law if not its language.
New Jersey decisions have consistently held to the mere privilege doctrine;
approving in one case a statute with an extremely "loose" administrative standard
(Hinnekens v. Magee, 135 N. J. L. 537, 53 A. 2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1947)) and ap-
proving in another case the grant of discretionary authority as to giving hearings
at all (Tichenor v. MaGee, 4 N. J. Super. 467, 67 A. 2d 895 (1949). However, in
Wolan v. Ferber, 12 N. J. Super. 167, 79 A. 2d 86 (1951), the court expresses
doubt as to the adequacy of the standard, "or any other reasonable grounds."
Another state which, like Virginia, has an early case holding "the owner's right
to use his vehicle after complying with the statutory duties" to be a substantial
property right, is Iowa. State v. Gish, 168 Iowa 70. 150 N. W. 37 (1914) ; and
again like Virginia, the law of the case (which is well reasoned) has been under-
mined by a later decision. Doyle v. Kahl, 46 S. W. 52 (Iowa 1951).
" 58 Idaho 493, 76 P. 2d 917 (1938). To almost the same effect is Thompson
v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579 (1930). See note 38 mipra.
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involved, 40 permitted the Commissioner to "deny to the owner or opera-
tor of the motor vehicle the right to the use, in a lawful manner, of his
property," in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Con-
stitution.41
The highest court of North Dakota has used language in a recent
case which would indicate that it also views the right to operate a motor
vehicle as considerably more than a privilege subject to suspension with-
out safeguards. In Helland V. Jones4 2 that court in dismissing an ap-
peal by the State Highway Commissioner from a lower court's reversal
of his refusal to reissue applicant's license said: "His [the applicant's]
personal right to freedom of action in regard to driving a motor vehicle
on the highways is involved. That is an important right under our
present mode of living."
In a recent decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court it was
stated that, "a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the
nature of a right of which the licensee may not be deprived save in the
manner and upon the conditions prescribed by the statute." 48  Just
what constitutes a "privilege in the nature of a right" is not clear, but
considering the attitude of watchfulness with which this court views
administrative actions4 4 it is doubtful that anything less than due process
of law would suffice to take away a privilege so labelled.
From an examination of the statutes of the various states it appears
that the overwhelming majority of legislatures are convinced that a
driver is entitled to a hearing either preceding or immediately following
a suspension of his license. 5 However, if a statutes does not spell out
" The provision under attack was a subsection of the Uniform Motor Vehicle
Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act: "The department is hereby authorized to
suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon
a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee....
"Has been involved as a driver in any accident resulting in the death or personal
injury of another or serious property damage." Most states which have adopted
this Act change this subsection so as to make "fault' the basis of the suspension.
"1 In a later decision, O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 202 P. 2d 401(1949), dealing with a different matter, the Idaho court displays a highly en-
lightened concept of licenses in general.
4237 N. W. 2d 513, 514 (N. D. 1949).
"It re Wright, 228,N. C. 584, 489, 46 S. E. 2d 696, 699, 700 (1948). The
same court in State v. McDaniels, 219 N. C. 763, 764, 14 S. E. 2d 793, 794 (1941),
had referred to a drivers' license as "evidence of a privilege granted by the State."
" See Bowie v. West Jefferson, 231 N. C. 408, 411, 57 S. E. 2d 369, 371 (1949)
and cases cited therein.
" The only state statutes which permit discretionary suspension and revocations
by administrative agencies without an administrative examination or hearing before
or after suspension are: CONN. GEN. STAT. §2456 (Rev. 1949), with full hearing
on appeal to the superior court (§2458) ; Ky. REV. STAT. §186.570 (1948), with§18.580 providing for appeal at which "the quarterly court may grant adequate
relief"; N. H. Rav. LAws c. 118, §33 (1942) with §34 providing hearing at which
the court may "determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license"; N. J.
STAT. ANN. §39:5-38 (1945) with §39:5-23 providing review of the entire record
if a hearing is given, otherwise mandamus will lie; OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §296
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the details of the hearing (which few of them do), the necessary pro-
cedures may yet depend on whether the courts of a particular jurisdic-
tion regard a driver license as a mere privilege to be withdrawn sum-
marily, or as something more, to be withdrawn only with due process
of law.46
The Uniform Motor-Vehicle Operators' and Chauffeurs' License Act
Because the Uniform Act, with varying modifications, is in force in
many states, 47 and because it does not spell out the details attendant
to its required hearing, the pertinent sections of that act have been
chosen for analysis.48
The first section of the Act to be considered is section 30.49 In it the
(1949) with §300 providing full review at which the court may affirm, reverse,
or modify; R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 86, §6 (1938) with a full appeal; and WIs. STAT.
§85.08 (1949) in which the department may refuse a hearing, but such procedure
is probably subject to the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure
Act in which §277.07 (the Wisconsin statute) requires a full fair hearing in any
contested case.
41 It can be argued that regardless of how the courts view a particular activity,
when the Legislature provides for a hearing regarding that activity it means a
hearing in the judicial concept with all necessary safeguards. The Supreme Court
of the United States so held where a statute required a "full hearing." Morgan
v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936). It has been said that the necessity of
notice and hearing in driver license suspension cases depends upon statutory pro-
visions. See note, 10 A. L. R. 2d 833, 834. This is generally true but with ex-
ceptions Which will depend on how the courts of a particular jurisdiction view
the operation of a motor vehicle. For instance, a statute failing to provide notice
and hearing would certainly be held unconstitutional in Idaho. That court in State
v. Kouni, 58 Idaho 493,76 P. 2d 917 (1938), clearly labelled the operation of a motor
vehicle a property right which could not be taken away without due process of
law. Futhermore, the procedures which would be absolutely required at a hearing
in a particular state could easily depend on the attitude of the courts of that state
toward the operation of a motor vehicle. A court dealing with a statute requiring
a hearing could, if driving were labelled a mere privilege, permit any kind of
hearing without any procedural safeguards whatsoever; whereas if the activity
had been labelled by that court as something more than a mere privilege, the court
would probably be impelled to require some semblance of a full and fair hearing.
'" States in which the original Act is in force substantially as written are:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
"' This material, in the absence of special provisions in the statutes of a par-
ticular jurisdiction, should be applicable to all statutes providing discretionary
administrative suspensions or revocations.
," "(a) The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an opera-
tor or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or
other sufficient evidence that the licensee:
1. Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is re-
quired upon conviction;
2. Has been involved as a driver in any accident resulting in the death or per-
sonal injury of another or serious property damage;
3. Has been convicted with such frequency of serious offenses against traffic
regulations governing the movement of vehicles as to indicate a disrespect for
traffic laws and a disregard for the safety of other persons on the highways;
4. Is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle;
5. Is incompentent to drive a motor vehicle;
6. Has permitted an unlawful or fradulent use of such license; or
19511
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'department administering the Act is given the power to suspend an opera-
tor's license without preliminary hearing, for any of the several listed
reasons.5 0 Following the suspension, notice and opportunity to be heard
must be given the licensee. The present inquiry is as to the nature and
procedure of this hearing.
THE HEARING
1. The "Complaint." It is clear from the statute that in the great
majority of cases the department will itself initiate the proceedings for
suspension. This appears from the fact that most of the reasons for
suspension are based on convictions or other conduct which is a part of
a driver's permanent record. This record is ordinarily found only in
the files of the department. However, in cases of incompetency or
habitual recklessness, the proceedings could, and probably would, be
instigated by persons outside the department. This could be done by
letter, .petition, etc. Is the department then expected to make a pre-
liminary investigation before making the initial suspension, and if so
are the facts uncovered put in evidence at the subsequent hearing?
Since the initial suspension is to occur only on a showing by records
"or other sufficient evidence," certainly a letter or petition would not
support action without some investigation.
As to whether the prosecuting witness must appear at hearing and
whether the facts uncovered by the preliminary investigation must be
7. Has committed an offense in another state which if committed in this state
would be grounds for suspension or, revocation.(b) Upon suspending the license of any person as hereinbefore in this section
authorized, the department shall immediately notify the licensee in writing and
upon his request shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing as early as practical
within not to exceed 20 days after receipt of such request in the county wherein
the licensee resides unless the department and the licensee agree that such hearing
may be held in some other county. Upon such hearing the commissioner or his
duly authorized agent may administer oaths and may issue subpoenas for the attend-
ance of witnesses and the production of relevant books and papers and may require
a reexamination of the licensee. Upon such hearing the department shall either
rescind its order of suspension or, good cause appearing therefor, may extend the
suspension of such license or revoke such license."
The comparable statutes in the various states which have passed this Act in
forms substantially similar to the original Act are as follows: ALA. CODE ANN.
tit. 36, §68 (1940) ; ARiz. CODE ANN. §§66-249, 66-252 (1939); ARx. STAT. ANN.
§§75-334, 75-338 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 16, §§145, 149 (1935); DEL. REv.
CODE §5606 (1935); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§322.27, 332.31 (1943); IDAHO CODE §§49-
330, 49-334 (1947); IOWA CODE §§321.210, 321.215 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§8-250, 8-255 (1949); LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §414(3), (4) (1950); MD. ANN.
CODE GEN. LAWs art. 66Y2 §§95, 99 (Cum. Supp. 1947) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§171,
18, 19 (West 1945); Miss. CODE ANN. §8107 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.§§31-147, 31-152 (1947); N. C. GEN. STAT. §§20-16, 20-25 (Supp. 1951); ORE.
Comp. LAws ANN. §§115-219, 115-220 (Supp. 1947) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§192,
193 (Supp. 1950); TENN. CODE ANN. §2715.25 (1934) ; Tzx. REv. CIR. STAT. ANN.
art. 667 b §§22 (b), 33 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§57-4-22, 57-4-23 (1943);
WASH. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §6312-66 (1937); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. §60-1515 (3)
(Supp. 1949).
"o See note 49 supra.
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put in evidence at hearing, the law is unsettled. These problems are
merely raised at this point and will be discussed in the subsection on
Evidence.
2. Notice. From the statutory mandate, "the department shall im-
mediately notify the licensee in writing," it would seem that some sort
of "personal service" is necessary to effectuate a suspension. This could
be accomplished by having an officer serve the suspension notice or by
delivery of a registered letter. However, if the officer was unable to
find the licensee, or if the licensee refused to accept the registered letter,
or if -due to a change of address or an incomplete address the letter was
never received, under a literal interpretation of the statute the suspen-
sion might be ineffective.
A more reasonable rule would be that exemplified by N. C. Gen.
Stat. §2048. That statute states that if the department sends a letter
to the address which the licensee himself has furnished the department
(on his application for a license), the service is complete four days after
mailing.5 1
The notice should contain the "time, place, and offense of which
there has been a conviction, but in cases where the records of the division
giving rise to the complaint consist of accident reports or other &tocu-
ments, the specific acts or conduct relied on by the commissioner with
respect to each accident should be set out in the notice, as well as the
names of the operators of the other vehicles involved, if they appear on
the reports." 52
3. The Issues To Be Decided. Once the hearing has begun, the
first issue to be determined is whether or not the licensee's conduct has
placed him within one of the listed conditions which will justify a sus-
pension. For instance, has he committed enough serious violations of
traffic regulations to satisfy the department that he has a 'disregard for
such regulations and for the safety of other persons? Or, is he an
habitually reckless or negligent driver ?58 If this issue is decided in the
affirmative, what next?
Since the statutory direction is not that the department shall, or
must suspend the license on an affirmative finding on the first issue,
the legislature must have contemplated situations in which the first issue
Ratliff v. State, '182 Tenn. 177, 184 S. W. 2d 572 (1944) holds that where
highway officers take possession of the license following an arrest, no notice is
necessary. (Query, as to the wisdom of granting authority to take a license im-
mediately following an arrest.)
Willis v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 294, 298-299, 56 S. E. 2d 222, 224 (1949).
Or, as in North Carolina, has he "within one (1) year, been convicted of two
or more charges of speeding in excess of fifty-five (55) and not more than seventy-
five miles per hour, or of one or more charges of reckless driving and one or more
charges of speeding in excess of fifty-five (55) and not more than seventy-five(75) miles per hour"? N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-16 (a) 9. (Supp. 1951).
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would be answered against the licensee but in which nevertheless the
license should not be suspended. A case illustrating this point was
decided in Pennsylvania in 1944.54 In that case the licensee had broken
the speed limit which was one of the offenses for which his license could
be suspended.5 5 After hearing, the Secretary suspended the license and
the licensee appealed to the court of common pleas. The court, on a
showing that petitioner had been driving since 1914 without a previous
arrest, had used his car chiefly for going to and from work, and had
exceeded the speed limit by only a few miles,, held the violation to be
only "technical" and reinstated the license.5 6 On the Secretary's ap-
peal to the supreme court the reinstatement was affirmed.
So it appears that there are two issues to be decided: (1) whether
or not the licensee's conduct has been such as to bring him within the
department's jurisdiction under the statute, and (2) whether the license
shall in fact be suspended.
4. Evidence. The statute grants to the representatives of the de-
partment who hold the hearing, the power to administer oaths and
issue subpoenas,57 which may be taken to indicate that evidence, rather
than informal statements, should be produced at the hearing. This
" Appeal of Schwartz, 348 Pa. 267, 35 A. 2d 290 (1944).
" "(b> The secretary may suspend the operator's license . . . after a hearing
before the secretary or his representative . . . whenever the secretary finds upon
sufficient ewidence ... that such person has committed any violation of the motor
vehicle laws of this Commonwealth." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §192 (1939).
" The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted the scope of review on
appeal from the department to be full de novo hearing with the court having
power "to determine anew whether the operator's license should be suspended."
Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 399, 186 At. 65, 69 (1936). This interpreta-
tion of the statute has been affirmed in an interesting series of cases which will be
discussed further in this note. It is in conflict with the North Carolina Supreme
Court's interpretation of the same statute as expressed in In re Wright, 228 N. C.
584, 46 S. E. 2d 696 (1948). This conflict will also be discussed under the section,
Review.
In the Fimk case the court also stated, in effect, that on the hearing, the Secre-
tary has discharged his statutory function when he has decided that this writer
has listed as "issue number one" [i.e. finding a violation so as to bring the licensee
within the operation of the statutes]. Reiterated in Appeal of Oesterling, 347 Pa.
241, 31 A. 2d 905 (1943). This appears to mean that the Secretary is to suspend
the. license whenever he finds a violation regardless of any mitigating circumstances
which might be present; and the court is to be the sole determiner of whether the
suspension was in fact justified.
In view of the scope of review provided under Pennsylvania law this reasoning
probably results in little, if any, substantial injustice. Nevertheless, it is respect-
fully submitted that such was not intended by the Legislature and that the result
is questionable. It places all discretion in the court and none in the department.
The basic reason for the creation of administrative tribunals is to make use of
the experience and special abilities of those officials closest to the problem, and to
remove many of the decisions which require that experience and particular skill
from the work load of the courts, thus leaving the courts to keep a watchful eye
on all such agencies in order to secure a proper administration of justice as known
to American law. The law of Pennsylvania on this particular point defeats that
purpose.
" See note 49 supra.
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would of course, necessitate the exclusion of testimony not given under
oath58 Nor should a decision be made which is supported only by
hearsay evidence. 59 However, common law rules of evidence are not
applicable.6 0  As is the case with most administrative hearings, no set
rules as to the kind of evidence admissible may be stated. The modern
trend is toward an acceptance of evidence that satisfies the standard set
forth by Judge Learned Hand in Nat. Labor Relations Board v. Reming-
ton Rand, Inc. :61 "evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed
to rely in serious affairs."16 2
Whether or not the licensee has the right to confront and cross-
examine his accusers will -depend on various factors. The exact point
seems to have been raised -in only one of the states which have enacted
the statute.6 3 In a case decided in 1939,64 the Pennsylvania Supreme
" In a New Jersey decision in which the court quoted with approval from 22
C. J. 66 these words appear, ".... testimony is accurately used to designate only
a particular kind or species of evidence, namely, that which comes to the tribunal
through living witnesses speaking under oath in the presence of the tribunal."
[Italics added] Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N. J. Misc. 633, - , 16 A. 2d 80, 89
(Ch. 1940).
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in reference to the reading of medical
textbooks to the jury, has said, "The theory which excludes the reading of such
publications is based upon the idea that declarations in a book or opinions of ex-
perts contained therein, are not under oath, and hence cannot be classified as evi-
dence." '[Italics supplied] Conn v. Seaboard R. R., 201 N. C. 157, 160, 159 S. E.
331, 333 (1931),
"' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197
(1938) ; Maley v. Thomasville Furn. Co., 214 N. C. 589, 200 S. E. 438 (1939).
In a California case concerned with the revocation by the city council of peti-
tioner's license to operate an auto-wrecking business where the only "evidence"
was a letter from the chief of police setting forth various violations of ordinances,
the concurring opinion agreed that the petitioner did not have to rebut the charges
contained in the letter as "there was no evidence to rebut." The opinion adds that
even were the letter to be considered as evidence it was only hearsay and, "there
is no substantial evidence to support an administrative decision if the only evidence
is hearsay." Walker v. San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 129 P. 2d 349, 351(1942).
" People ex rel. Albrecht v. Harnett, 221 App. Div. 487, 224 N. Y. Supp. 97(4th Dept. 1927). See also cases cited in note 59 supra.
For recent discussions of evidence requirements at the administrative level see
Cahill, Administrative Agencies; Also Some Minnesota and Wisconsin Compari-
son, 34 MARg. L. Rav. 90 (1950) ; Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative
Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1950).
"94 F. 2d 862 (1938).
"Id. at 873. This phraseology is adopted in the California Administrative
Procedure Act. CAL. POLITICAL ConE ANN. §11513 (Supp. '1945) (However, this
Act is not applicable to the Department of Motor Vehicles). Substantially the
same language appears in the Model State Administrative Procedure Act. The
Federal Administrative Procedure Act requires "reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence."
" However, in Alabama the Attorney General has ruled as follows: "The hear-
ing referred to in this section includes a fair hearing, together with all of its
accustomed incidents. . . ." REP. ATr. GEN. July-Sept., 1944 p. 64.
A New York court speaks as follows concerning a fair hearing: "Petitioner has
a right to be confronted with the witness at such hearing and given an opportunity
to cross examine his accusers. That is the only way he can secure a fair hearing."
1951]
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Court held that petitioner had no right to cross-examine his accuser
and affirmed a suspension made by the department after a hearing at
which the accused was not present. 65 However, the court took the
occasion to reprimand the Secretary for permitting such a procedure.00
A New York case decided in the same year and on almost identical
facts (but under a different statute), vacated the commissioner's order
of suspension, holding that substantial rights had been violated. 6t
The substantial, and probably controlling difference in the statutes,
was the scope of judicial review provided by each. Pennsylvania has
interpreted its statute as providing a full de novo hearing by the trial
court.68 The New York statute provides only a review of the record.00
In addition to the difference in statutes it is also noteworthy that the
Pennsylvania court labels suspension by the Secretary as an adminis-
trative act.1 0 The New York case, in spite of statutory language to the
effect that the commissioner's act is administrative and to be reviewed
as such, holds that the function is quasi-judicial.71 Certainly, the right
[Italics added] Application of Godwin, 173 Misc. 169, - 17 N. Y. S. 2d 426,
428 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
"Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A. 2d 408 (1939) (The arresting
officer failed to appear at hearing. A postponement was made and a second hear-
ing held of which the licensee had no notice and at which he did not appear. At
the second hearing the officer testified and suspension followed).
" The court rested its decision on two grounds: (1) there had been no denial of
due process since the decision by the Secretary was an "administrative" and not
a "judicial" function; (2) the full de itovo hearing on appeal "remedied the in-
fringement of any constitutional right of which defendent may have been deprived."
Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 474, 9 A. 2d 408, 411 (1939).
Without the full de novo review on all issues, a procedure earlier established
by a strained interpretation of the statute providing for court rehearing, the second
reason given above could not have existed. See section on Review and note 79,
infra.
"0 "We are free to say, however, that the procedure followed by the Secretary,
in cases of this character (i.e. taking the testimony at different times and places
of the licensee charged with a violation of the Vehicle Code, and of the arresting
officer who brings the charge), is not the most desirable under the circumstances.
While it may be permissible by law, especially in view of the right of the licensee
to appeal to the court of common pleas, it does not, in our opinion, conform to the
rudimentary requirements of fair play, and afford an open and impartial hearing."
Id. at 474, 9 A. 2d at 411.
"'Application of Goodwin, 173 Misc. 169, - , 17 N. Y. S. 2d 426, 428 (Sup.
Ct. 1940). See note 63 supra. To the same effect are: Application of Kafka, 272
App. Div. 364, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 179 (1st Dept. 1947) ; Sands v. Fletcher, 54 N. Y. S.
2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
" Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936). For a complete
discussion of the function of the appeal under the Pennsylvania interpretation of
the statute see Commonwealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 60 A. 2d 37 (1948).
11 N. Y. VEHicLE LAW §71-6, Cohn v. Fletcher, 272 App. Div. 1080, 75 N. Y. S.
2d 329 (3d Dept. 1947) ; Sheridan v. Fletcher, 270 App. Div. 29, 58 N. Y. S. 2d
466 (3d Dept. 1945); Heart v. Fletcher, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (Sup. Ct. 1945);
Sands v. Fletcher, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 449 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
" Commonwealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A. 2d 408 (1939).
" Application of Goodwin, 173 Misc. 169, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 426 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936), holds that a hearing held in the
exercise of the legislative function of rate-setting is quasi-jiudicial.
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to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses at the initial hearing
should be required in any jurisdiction which permits the court; on re-
view, to base any part of its decision on matters which were established
at the initial hearing.
5. The Decision. Subsection (b) of section 30 states: "Upon such
hearing the department shall either rescind its order of suspension or,
good cause appearing therefor, may extend the suspension of such li-
cense or revoke such license." 72
Under a literal interpretation of the above subsection the department
has no authority to shorten a suspension. It may rescind its order,
extend the suspension, or revoke the license.7 3 The act provides in a
later section that suspensions shall not be for more than one year except
for driving while a license is suspended or revoked.7 4 If it should so
happen that the department should issue its initial suspension (as pro-
vided in subsection (a)) for less than a year, the only question at the
hearing would be whether the suspension had been wrongfully made
in the first instance, which would justify rescinding its order; or whether
the circumstances were so aggravated as to justify extending the sus-
pension or revoking the license. There would be no encouragement to
licensees to attempt to show mitigating circumstances which would
justify a reduction in the suspension.7 5 If such an interpretation were
adhered to there would probably be few demands for hearings. It is
not beyond possibility that the legislature intended to restrict the power
of the department in this manner, but it would seem unlikely.
The drafters of the Act probably intended for the initial suspension
to be for no definite period. The notice could inform the licensee that
his license was suspended indefinitely and if no mitigating circumstances
were shown the suspension would be effective for the maximum statu-
tory period. At hearing a determination could be made as to just how
long the suspension was to remain in effect. Of course, if the licensee
did not ask for a hearing the provisional period would stand. This
procedure would satisfy the literal wording of the statute, but would
probably cause a big increase in the number of hearings demanded.
A third possibility, and probably the one being used, is for the initial
" UNIFORM MOTOR VEHICLE OPERATORS' AND CHAUFFEURS' LIcENsE AcT.
"The North Carolina adaptation of this section omits "or revoke such license."
N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-16 (Supp. 1951). Hence the only authority given to the
department under this adaptation is to rescind its order, or extend the suspension.
"UNIFORM MOTOR VEICLE OPERATORS' AND CHAUFFEURS' LICENSE AcT. 832,
38. Some states have incorporated into their adaptation of the Act a section which
specifies the minimum and maximum time for suspensions resulting from particular
offenses. N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-19 (Supp. 1951) is typical.
" It is highly possible that the persons holding these hearings are not aware of
the literal limitations on their authority and modify the suspension whenever they
think the circumstances justify such action. It is unlikely that there would be an
appeal from such a decision.
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suspension to be made for the maximum period allowed; and on a
showing of justifying circumstances to reduce the period accordingly. 0
Another problem which could arise from the practical administration
of this section, is whether it permits a decision to be recommended by
the department representative who hears the case and later made final
by a higher official in the department. The wording of the statute shows
no indication that recommended decisions were contemplated. How-
ever, there is no specific provision forbidding such a procedure. A de-
partment using this method might find itself confronted with the rule of
the Morgan case: "he who decides must hear," which is held to mean
that the one making the final decision must at least address himself to
the evidence. 77
THE REVIEW
Section 35 of the Act provides for court review of any discretionary
suspension, cancellation, or revocation. Upon this review it is the duty
of the court "to take testimony and examine into the facts of the case
and to determine whether the petitioner is entitled to a license or is
subject to suspension, cancellation, or revocation of license under the
provisions of this act."
The first interpretation of this section was by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Funk.78 This case declared that
the reviewing court was "to hear de novo the witnesses . . . and, from
the testimony taken, to determine anew whether the operator's license
should be suspended."79 [Italics added] This interpretation has stood
"' The writer is informed that this procedure is the one used by the Department
of Motor Vehicles of North Carolina.
"' The hearing required in a proceding of quasi-judicial character "is designed
to afford the safeguard that the one who decides shall be bound in good conscience
to consider the evidence, to be guided by that alone, and to reach his conclusion
uninfluenced by extraneous considerations....
"... the weight ascribed . . . to the findings . . . rests upon the assumption
that the officer who makes the findings has addressed himself to the evidence. . ."
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468, 480-481 (1936). As a practical matter
a department could save time, expense, and perhaps trouble if the officer hearing
the case is permitted to make the final decision.
" 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936). The pertinent part of the section as in
force in Pennsylvania at the time of this decision read as follows: ". . . to take
testimony and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the
petitioner is subject to suspension of operator's license or learner's permit under
the provisions of this Act." So far as the point under discussion is concerned
this is substantially the same as the wording of the original act.
70 Id. at 399, 186 Atl. at 69. It can be seen from the reasoning of Common-
wealth v. Cronin, 336 Pa. 469, 9 A. 2d 408 (1939) (the case which held that the
licensee had no right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at the initial hearing;
see subsection on Evidence, supra) that if the rule of the Funk case had not been
as it was (i.e. a full de nlovo review on all issues) the holding of the Croni case
would have been otherwise. This conclusion is made more positive by language
from the opinion in Commonwealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 643, 60 A. 2d 37, 38
(1948). "One of the principal offices of the appeal, in obedience to constitutional
requirements, is to furnish a judicial hearing on the merits. In no way does the
appeal partake of the nature of certiorari."
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as the law of Pennsylvania in spite of repeated efforts by the Secretary
of Revenue of that state to secure a change. s0 He has contended that
under the statute, the reviewing court must hear witnesses, etc., but if
the court find that the licensee is "subject to suspension" (i.e., the li-
censee has committed the charged offenses) it must affirm the Secre-
tary's order. 3 ' In 1939 the Legislature further confused the issue by
changing the wording of the statute.8 2 This change has been interpreted
by the court as bolstering the interpretation made in the Funk case.83
It appears clear that the opinion in the Funk case had stretched the
meaning of the statutory language;84 but it is by no means clear that
the change in the section by the Legislature was made to support such
an interpretation8 35
In a comparatively recent North Carolina case the supreme court
of that state extracted a different meaning from the same section.8 6
According to that court, the department not only "finds upon sufficient
80 See cases discussed in note 81 infra.
" In Appeal of Oesterling, 347 Pa. 241, 31 A. 2d 905 (1943), the court of com-
mon pleas agreed with the Secretary but was reversed on appeal. In Appeal of
Handwerk, 348 Pa. 263, 35 A. 2d 289 (1944), the Supreme Court again rebuffed
the Secretary's attempts to secure a change in the interpretation. To the same
effect are Appeal of Schwartz, 348 Pa. 267, 35 A. 2d 290 (1944), and Common-
wealth v. Herzog, 359 Pa. 641, 60 A. 2d 37 (1948). In Commonwealth v. Garman,
361 Pa. 643, 66 A. 2d 271 (1949), the court leaned slightly toward the Secretary's
contentions, but in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 364 Pa. 566, 73 A. 2d 676 (1950),
the court definitely slammed the door on the Secretary in a case raising the very
issue. The court here points out that in 1939 the Legislature changed the wording
of the section so as definitely to conform with the interpretation set out in Com-
monwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936). See note 82 infra.
3"At the time Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 Atl. 65 (1936), was
decided the controlling part of the section read as follows: ".... to take testimony
and examine into the facts of the case, and to determine whether the petitioner is
subjct to suspension of operator's license or learner's permit under the provisions
of this Act."
The Legislature, in 1939, inserted after the word "permit" above, the words,
"or whether he may be deprived of the privilege of applying for an operator's license
or learner's permit by the secretary. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §193 (Supp.
1950).
83 Commonwealth v. Wagner, 364 Pa. 566, 73 A. 2d 676 (1950).
"'For an interpretation which is in accord with not only the words of the
statute but also with the fundamental purposes of administrative law, see In re
Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 589, 46 S. E. 2d 696, 700 (1948)
(Discussed in text, infra p. -).
The interpretation made in the Funk case was possibly made to meet the con-
stitutional arguments there presented; and once having been made the Pennsylvania
Court seems determined to uphold it.
11 The theory upon which the Wagner case bases its reasoning seems to be this:
Since the legislature did make some change in the wording of the statute and yet
neglected to make changes which would definitely refute the earlier interpretation,
then the earlier interpretation must have met the Legislature's approval. Reason-
ing along such lines is certainly not without substance and logic, but it attributes
to the members of the Legislature an awareness of decisions and of theories of
law which they do not necessarily possess.
8' In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 46 S. E. 2d 696 (1948)
which is a rehearing of the same case reported in 228 N. C. 301, 45 S. E. 2d 370
(1947).
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evidence [whether] the offenses enumerated have been committed, 87
but also determines whether the license actually shall be suspended. 88
In fact, this second determination (ie., whether the license actually
shall be suspended) 8 9 is not subject to review by the court.00 If the
court finds, by taking testimony and examining into the facts of the
case, that issue number one (i.e., "whether the offenses enumerated
have been committed") in answerable in the affirmative, the order of
the department mut be affirmed. 1
In the same decision the North Carolina court refers to this as a
"full de novo review." 92  Since the final determination of one of the
two issues presented at the initial hearing is left with the department
and is not reviewable, it is obvious that this was a loose use of the
term, "full de novo review." 93  It is possible that in North Carolina a
review of this second issue could be secured by a different procedure
from that followed in this case, namely a proceeding to invoke the
"inherent power of the judicial branch of the government to review the
discretionary acts of an administrative officer."9 4
8 Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 397, 186 Atl. 65, 68 (1936). In this
case such a finding was held to be the extent of the Secretary's duty under the
section.
8 "It must be noted, however, that the discretion to suspend or revoke, is vested
in the department, subject to a judicial review of the facts upon which its action
is based. No discretionary power is conferred upon the Superior Court. Hence,
if the judge, upon the hearing, finds and concludes that the license of the petitioner
is in fact subject to suspension or revocation under the provisions of the statute,
the order of the department entered in conformity with the fact found must be
affirmed." In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 589, 46 S. E. 2d
696, 700 (1948).
This is the interpretation contended for by the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Revenue in Commonwealth v. Wagner, 364 Pa. 566, 73 A. 2d 676 (1950) and the
other cases cited in note 80 supra.
" This is what the writer has referred to as "issue number two." See subsec-
tion on The Issues To Be Decided, supra p. 37.
"0 See note 88 supra. "See note 88 supra.
" In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 589, 46 S. E. 2d 696,
700 (1948).
In the court's opinion on the first appeal of this case (228 N. C. 301, 303, 45
S. E. 2d 370, 372 (1947)), it was said that, "This is more than a review as upon
a writ of certiorari. It is a rehearing de novo, and the judge is not bound by the
findings of fact or the conclusions of law made by the department."
" "We hope that counsel understand in a de novo hearing the judgment of the
trial court is suspended and we determine the case as though it originated in our
court, and give no attention to the findings and judgment of the trial court...."
Reck v. Reck, 46 N. E. 2d 429, 430 (Ohio App. 1942). "Power to try a case de
novo vests a.court with full power to determine the issues and rights of all parties
involved. .. ." Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 298, 153 S. W. 2d 681,
692 (1941). In a case concerned with an appeal from a justice on the peace the
North Carolina court said, "On a appeal to the Superior Court the trial is de novo,
'a new trial of the whole matter.'" Fochtman v. Greer, 194 N. C. 674, 675, 140
S. E. 442 (1927). The phrase quoted by the court is from what is now N. C.
GEr. STAT. §1-300 (1943).
"In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 301, 303, 45 S. E. 2d 370,
372 (1947).
Once violations sufficient to justify suspension under the statute have been
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Comparing the Pennsylvania and North Carolina interpretations, it
would seem that the Pennsylvania court misinterpreted the section but
correctly referred to the review demanded by its interpretation, as a
de novo hearing. On the other hand, it seems that the North Carolina
court interpreted the statute correctly but was incorrect in referring
to the review demanded by its interpretation, as a full de novo hearing.
It is highly probable that the difference in the review provided, along
with the slight difference in the status given the activity in the two states
(mere privilege or right),95 will necessitate different procedures at the
initial hearings held in the two jurisdictions.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
The operation of motor vehicles on public highways is clearly subject
to reasonable regulations under the police power of the state. Although
the activity was early classed as a mere privilege (such as the use of
public property for profit-making activities, operating pool halls, moving
houses in the streets, etc.), the majority of cases show that at this date
the operation of an automobile has assumed a status more closely re-
sembling a right. Some cases have gone so far as to hold it a property"
right.
The privilege may not be suspended (other than temporarily) with-
out an administrative hearing unless a right to a full hearing by a court
is available. It may not be suspended arbitrarily or capriciously in any
case.
Proper procedure under the Uniform Motor-Vehicle Operators' and
Chauffeurs' License Act necessitates notice given (probably necessary
before the suspension can become effective), and a hearing on demand.
The notice should include a detailed statement of the causes for which
the suspension is made.
At the administrative hearing two issues are decided: (1) Has the
found, just what standards are to be used by the department to determine whether
the license should actually be suspended? According to the reasoning of one recent
case, this lack of review as to the second issue could well raise a problem of
standards. The Virginia Court in Butler v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 411, 53 S. E.
2d 152 (1949), refused to uphold the sufficiency of an administrative finding that
the licensee was a 'habitual violator' and insisted that the trial court, on review,
hear evidence related "to the question whether it was necessary 'for the safety of
the public on the highways' to revoke the operator's license. . . ." The court said,
"In the first place, there is no standard to determine what constitutes an habitual
violator of such laws. . . ." Id. at 421, 53 S. E. 2d at 156.
" "The permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of the Com-
monwealth is not embraced within the term civil rights, nor is a license to do so
a contract or a right of property in any legal or constitutional sense." Common-
wealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 395, 186 Atl. 65, 67 (1936).
"A license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege in the nature of a right of
which the licensee may not be deprived save in the manner and upon the conditions
prescribed by statute." It re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N. C. 584, 589,
46 S. E. 2d 696, 699, 700 (1948).
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licensee committed such violations as will give the department the power
to suspend his license, and (2) shall the license be suspended? The
initial suspension may be rescinded or extended; whether it may be
shortened remains in doubt.
The rules of evidence will largely depend on the scope of the review.
However, there at least should be evidence to support the finding of
"good cause" which will justify a continuance of the suspension. Where,
on petition to the courts a full de novo hearing on all issues is provided,
the licensee at the initial hearing has no right to be confronted by his
accusers or to cross-examine witnesses. Where the review is only of
the record, the rules of a full hearing should apply at the administrative
level. It would seem that a full, fair hearing by the agency would be
necessary in a jurisdiction providing anything less than a full de novo
review.
The Uniform Act does not provide for recommended decisions. If
they are used, the rule that "the official who makes the decision must
address himself to the evidence," should apply. This would almost
certainly be true in states holding that the hearing is quasi-judicial.
The scope of the review provided by the Act is in dispute. The
wording itself indicates that only the issue of jurisdiction should be
reviewed, but that evidence should be taken anew to determine this
issue. Such a review would be more in keeping with the fundamental
principles of administrative law in that it permits use of specialized
skills and knowledge of officials closest to the problem.
It may be added that the Act is loosely worded, leaving room for
most of the law governing the details of administration to be settled
by the agencies and courts of the particular jurisdictions. This fact,
added to the confusion and conflict regarding the nature of the privilege
(or right), necessarily results in a great variety of procedures in the
different states.
Because of this conflict of rulings and variety of procedures, the fol-
lowing suggestions are respectfully submitted: Let there be an under-
standing that once the legislature has set out what it considers the neces-
sary qualifications for driving an automobile, all citizens have a right to
attempt to meet those qualifications. Those who meet the requirements
have a right to be issued a license; and the license is evidence of a right
to the reasonable use of the public highways for the ordinary pursuits
of life.
In modern America the right to operate an automobile in a lawful
manner is a right of the greatest importance; certainly as important as
other rights around which considerably more safeguards have been
placed. It should be taken away (other than temporarily) only for
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good causes arrived at by a fair and impartial investigation or hearing.
This initial hearing should be surrounded by the safeguards which will
insure the fair treatment demanded by our Anglo-Saxon legal heritage;
i.e., notice, reliable evidence, the right to cross-examine, findings of fact
with a decision based on those findings, and provision for some type of
judicial review.
A review of the material discussed in the above note and a study of
the cases cited therein will reveal that the trend in the majority of juris-
dictions is in the direction of such an attitude toward the nature of the
license and the safeguards to be placed about it.
